

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 AMMAN 5739

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, US, JO

SUBJECT: TALK WITH PRIME MINISTER RIFAI ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

REF: SECTO 10067

1. SUMMARY: RIFAI SAYS SYRIAN REPORTS OF YOUR VISIT SAY IT WAS NOT GOODM THEY ARE CONVINCED, AS IS HE, THERE IS NO GIVE ON THE GOLAN AND INDEED THAT THE US HAS AGREED WITH ISRAEL NOT TO PUSH ON THE NEXT STEP ON THE GOLAN. ISRAEL IN RETURN WILL KEEP PRESSURE OFF THE US IN AN ELECTION YEAR. THE INTERIM STEP IS BAD FOR EGYPT. IT IS PAYING MUCH TOO HIGH A PRICE. EGYPT IS BEING REMOVED FROM THE CONFRONTATION STATES AND HAS ACCEPTED VIRTUAL NON-BELLIGERENCY. EGYPT WILL BE DISAPPOINTED IN US PROMISES OF AID IF THAT IS WHAT HAS PERSUADED SADAT TO GIVE UP SO MUCH. SYRIA WILL NOT GO TO GENEVA WITHOUT ISRAELI ASSURANCES OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. SYRIA WILL ACCEPT (RIFAI SAYS) AS AN INTERIM STEP 2 TO 3 KILOMETERS ALL ALONG THE GOLAN. SYRIA WILL MOVE ITS AIR DEFENSE MISSILES IMMEDIATELY TO JORDAN IF US SAYS NO ON HAWKS AND THE GET REPLACEMENTS FROM SOVIETS. FIFAI BELIEVES EVENTUAL FEDERATION WITH SYRIA POSSIBLE AND WORTH TRYING. SYRIANS HAD NOT PRESSED ON JOINT COMMAND. CLAIMS MILITARY COORDINATION

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WITH SYRIA STILL TO DEFEND AGAINST ISRAELI ATTACK.

RIFAI BELIEVES SYRIA WILL NOT SUCCEED IN EXPELLING ISRAEL FROM THE UN THIS YEAR. SYRIA IS LOOKING FOR A FIGHT WITH IRA1. PRINCE FAHD SEEMS SIDTURBED BY EGYPTIAN CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL. SYRIANS WANT TO TRY TO CHANGE PLO LEADERS. RIFAI REPEATED HIS BROAD INTEREST IN WHAT YOU CAN TELL THEM ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE POSITION OF EGYPT, FUTURE STEPS AND THE HAWK SALE. RIFAI AND KING BOTH SEEM TO BE REFLECTING A CHANGING POSION TOWARD US MOTIVATED BY SKEPTICISM THAT CONGRESS WILL LET US KEEP OR HONOR COMMITMENTS TO COUNTRIES LIKE JORDAN IN THE FACE OF COMING ELECTIONS AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ISRAELI LOBBY. END SUMMARY.

2. AS A RESULT OF OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AUGUST 24, RIFAI ASKED TO SEE AT NOON AUGUST 25. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER TO HIM MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL.

3. RIFAI READ OVER THE MESSAGE AND THANKED ME FOR IT AND THEN GEGAN RATHER LONG MONOLOGUE ON HIS PART WHICH TOUCHED LN A NUMBER OF ISSUES ABOUT WHICH I HAD PREVIOUSLY PLANNED TO QUESTION HIM.

4. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION IN THE AREA WAS REALLY NOT VERY GOOD. HE ADDED POINTEDLY THE SYRIANS HAD SENT THEM THE FULL RECORD OF YOUR TALK WITH ASAD. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT VISIT THERE HAD NOT GONE WELL AT ALL. YOU HAD NOTHING CONCRETE TO OFFER THE THE SYRIANS AND IN FACT WHAT HAD BEEN SAID ABOUT THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULITES WAS NOT VERY HELPFUL ABOUT ANOTHER STEP ON THE GOLAN. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT THINK WE COULD DO ANYTHING ON THE GOLAN AND EVEN WORSE WAS NOW INCLINDED TO BELIEVE REPORTS WHICH EMANATED FROM ISRAELI RADIO THAT THERE WAS SOME KIND OF SECRET US-ISRAELI AGREEMENT THAT WHILE YOU WOULD MAKE A PRO FORMA ATTEMPT NEXT ON THE GOLAN IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US WOULD NOT PRESSURE OR PUSH ISRAEL TOWARDS ANYTHING ON THAT SCORE. RIFAI ADDED THAT HE ASSUMED SUCH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL WOULD ALSO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF CALLING SECRET

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OFF ISRAELI PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION DURING AN ELECTION YEAR. THUS ISRAEL WOULD HAVE STRETCHED OUT THE AGREEMENT PROCESS TO THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTION YEAR AND ALSO HAD EXACTED A PRICE WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT THE WHOLE ISSUE WOULD BE STALE-MATED.

5. RIFAI THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT JORDAN AND SYRIA

WERE ALSO DISTURBED ABOUT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN EGYPT. THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED NOW SEEMED TO HAVE GONE UP IN TERMS OF WHAT EGYPT HAD TO GIVE TO THE POINT THERE THEY REALLY DOUBTED THE WISDOM OF IT ALL. HE THEN TICKED OFF A NUMBER OF WHAT HE SAID HE BELIEVED TO BE THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH WORKED SHARPLY TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF EGYPT: (A) ONLY A SMALL SECTION OF SINAI WILL BE RETURNED AND NONE OF THE TERRITORY, OR VERY LITTLE OF IT, EVACUATED BY ISRAEL TO BE RETURNED TO ACTUAL EGYPTIAN CONTROL; (B) EGYPT HAS GIVEN A THREE-YEAR COMMITMENT ON THE PRESENT AGREEMENT AND FURTHER ONE THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL LAST UNTIL IT IS REPLACED WHICH MEANS THAT ISRAELIS HAVE OBTAINED A VIRTUAL STATE OF NON-BELLIGERENCY; (C) THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN THE AREA OF OCCUPIED SINAI WHERE THEY CAN SEE A CHICKEN WALKING IN LIBYA; (D) A REQUIREMENT THAT EGYPT MUST SHARE THE ROAD TO ABU RODEIS; AND (E) ISRAEL WOULD GET OVER \$3 BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SOPHISTICATED ARMANEMTS AND OTHER US ASSISTANCE. HE THEN SAID HE THOUGHT THAT TAKING EGYPT OUT OF THE ARAB WORLD WOULD RUN GREAT DANGERS FOR SADAT, INCLUDING THE ALIENATION OF HIS FRIENDS OUTSIDE OF EGYPT AND CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DISRUPTION INTERNALLY. HE ALLUDED TO REPORTS WHICH HE HAD SEEN OF THE DISAFFECTION OF SOME OF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY OVER THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT SADAT SEEMED TO BE RIDING ROUGHSHOD OVER THIS OPPOSITION WITHOUT MUCH OF A CARE. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT SADAT MIGHT BE MESMERIZED BY LARGE AMOUNTS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO HELP HIM WITH HIS INTERNAL PROBLEMS. EGYPT TELLS US NOTHING WHICH JUST FEEDS SUSPICIONS

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RIFAI CLAIMED THAT IF THIS WAS HIS MOTIVE FOR GOING ALONG WITH SO MANY CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS, THEN HE SHOULD TAKE CARE BECAUSE IT WOULD TAKE SEVERAL YEARS AT LEAST TO DELIVER US ASSISTANCE AND EVEN THEN THE AMOUNTS DISCUSSED WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO PROVIDE FOR THE WELL-BEING OR EVEN THE

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE 37 MILLION PEASANTS LIVING IN EGYPT. RIFAI THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT SYRIA HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD REFUSE TO GO TO GENEVA UNLESS IT WAS CONVINCED THAT GENEVA WOULD DISCUSS AND AGREE UPON THE TERMS FOR COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR THE CONDITIONS FOR A FULL PEACE IN THE AREA. ASAD WOULD RESIST ANY INTERIM STEP, BUT RIFAI'S VIEW WAS THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY EVENTUALLY ACCEPT 2-3 KILOMETERS ALL ALONG THE FRONT. HOWEVER RIFAI DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE US ACHIEVING ANYTHING LIKE THIS. IT WOULD MEAN TAKING ON THE HILLTOPS AND THE SETTLEMENTS AND THE ISRAELIS CONSIDERED THOSE AS MATTERS OF STRATEGIC NECESSITY OR PRINCIPLE AND THEREFORE HE HELD LITTLE HOPE OF GETTING ANYTHING DONE.

6. EGYPT HAS FURTHER RAISED SUSPICIONS IN SYRIA AND JORDAN BY ITS PRESSURE FOR AN EARLY MEETING AT GENEVA. WITHOUT ANY PREPARATION, SYRIANS AND JORDANIANS SEE GENEVA AS MERELY A HASTY OPERATION TO COVER EGYPTIAN

AGREEMENT TO AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT WHICH IN EFFECT IS A DE FACTO REMOVAL OF EGYPT FROM THE ARAB SIDE. THIS IS THE MAJOR REASON WHY SYRIA WILL REFUSE TO GO TO GENEVA.

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7. IN REPLY, I POINTED TO YOUR ASSURANCES IN THE SECOND

PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS. RIFAI SAID HE HOPED THAT WAS TRUE AND WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING TO YOU ABOUT IT, BUT HE THOUGHT THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ALL THE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF ISRAEL, TENDED TO NEGATE THE EFFECT OF WHAT WE WERE SAYING. IN REPLY I POINTED TO THE FACT THAT WHAT HAD BEEN CONTINUALLY COMING OUT OF ISRAEL WAS DESIGNED TO SERVE ISRAEL'S PURPOSE OF SPLITTING THE ARABS OVER THE INTERIM SETTLEMENT. I URGED HIM TO HOLD HIS CONCLUSIONS UNTIL HE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK FURTHER WITH YOU ABOUT WHAT THE REAL FACTS WERE. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THE ISRAELIS HAD PUT OUT A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT WAS ALLEGEDLY ACTUALLY INCLUDED IN NEGOTIATIONS, WE OUGHT ALSO TO GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF THE JORDANIANS, AS I KNEW YOU INTENDED TO DO, ABOUT WHAT WAS REALLY INVOLVED. FINALLY, I POINTED TO THE FACT THAT RIFAI HIMSELF THOUGHT ASAD WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A SMALL INTERIM WITHDRAWAL ALL ALONG THE LINE IN THE GOLAN AS ONE POSSIBLE HOPEFUL SIGN. I ASKED HIM IF ASAD HAD TOLD YOU THIS DIRECTLY ACCORDING TO THE SYRIAN RECORD OF CONVERSATION. HE SAID ASAD HAD NOT, BUT HE HAD HIS FIRM JUDGEMENT THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SYRIANS PROVIDED IT WAS ALL ALONG THE LINE. IT WOULD MEAN TACKLING ISRAELIS ON THE HILLS AND THE SETTLEMENTS AND THIS WOULD HELP ARAB CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD A REAL PEACE SETTLEMENT.

8. RIFAI THEN MOVED ON TO A DISCUSSION OF HAWKS. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE SYRIANS THAT ASAD HAD ALREADY TOLD YOU ONE THING THE JORDANIANS INTENDED TO SAY WHEN YOU WERE HERE: THAT IF THE US SAID NO TO JORDAN ON THE HAWK DEAL, THE SYRIANS WERE IMMEDIATELY READY TO MOVE ALL OF THEIR AIR DEFENSE MISSILES INTO JORDAN AND TO SEEK REPLACEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM THE SOVIETS. RIFAI LATER IN THE CONVERSATION ADDED FOR MY BENEFIT THAT HE THOUGHT  
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THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE QUICKLY TRAINING JORDANIANS TO USE THIS EQUIPMENT.

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PXPC SAID WITH A NOTE OF SOME IRRITATION THAT THE SYRIANS PASSED ON TO HIM A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO YOU THAT YOU HAD HOPED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING THE KING'S VISIT COULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE HAWK QUESTION HAD BEEN SETTLED.

RIFAI SAID THE COMMUNIQUE HAD TO COME AND THERE WAS NOTHING IN IT THAT ANYONE COULD TAKE EXCEPTION TO. HE WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE DEFENSIVE ABOUT IT THAN WHEN HE CALLED ME A DAY AGO ABOUT THE NEWS STORIES IN WASHINGTON WHICH APPARENTLY MISREPRESENTED THE COMMUNIQUE. I SHOWED HIM OUR COPY OF THE UPI STORY IN QUESTION, WHICH HE HAD APPARENTLY ALSO SEEN FROM HIS OWN SOURCES. HE SAID HE ASSUMED THIS WAS ANOTHER ISRAELI EFFORT TO THROW THE HAWK SALE OFF THE TRACKS. HE SAID ALSO THAT HE THOUGHT THAT SOME DAY THE SYRIANS WOULD LIKE TO BUY US MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT THAT NOW.

10. WE THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. I ASKED RIFAI WHAT JORDAN'S GOALS WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA. HE SAID THAT IN T, 10 OR 15 YEARS THEY HOPED TO EVOLVE A FEDERATION. IT WOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE THE ONLY TRUE FEDERATION THAT HAS REALLY EVER COME FROM THE ARABS - THAT CREATED IN 1957 BETWEEN JORDAN AND IRAQ BEFORE THE IRAQI OVERTHROW OF THE MONARCHY. UNDER THAT ARRANGEMENT EACH STATE WOULD LOOK TO A SINGLE PARLIAMENT AND HEAD OF STATE FOR THE FEDERATION ON SUCH COMMON ISSUES AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE. THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP WOULD BE AUTONOMOUS ON ALL OTHER MATTERS. HE THEN CITED THE FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO ALLOW HIS COUSIN TO BE KING OF THE WHOLE JORDANIAN-IRAQI FEDERATION IN RETURN FOR THE FACT THAT IRAQ WOULD PAY FOR EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE BILLS FOR BOTH THE FEDERATION AND JORDANUQZJ

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HQMGIS TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT WITH SYRIA WILL TAKE SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME TO EVOLVE. MEANWHILE THE NEW POLITICAL COMMAND PRESERVES THE KING'S RIGHT TO ACT ON ALL QUESTIONS OF COMMON INTEREST AS HE SEES FIT. NOTHING IS GIVEN UP, BUT COORDINATION IS ACHIEVED ON ALL MATTERS OF SIGNIFICANCE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. BESIDES, THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL WHICH WAS CREATED DURING ASAD'S VISIT TO JORDAN NEEDED SOMETHING OR SOMEONE TO REPORT TO AND THE NEW POLITICAL COMMAND FITS THE BILL. HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD INTRODUCED A LONG PARAGRAPH FOR JORDANIAN AGREEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD HAVE PERMITTED EACH ONE TO HAVE INTERVENED MILITARILY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER IF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN EACH STATE WAS IN ANY WAY THREATENED OR UNDER INTERNAL ATTACK. RIFAI SAID THAT THEY OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THIS AND WOULD CONTINUE

WTO DO THIS TO OTHER SIMILAI STEPS.

11. I ASKED RIFAI WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ASAD DIS-  
APPEARED FROM THE SCENE IN SYRIA. HE SAID THEN JORDAN  
WOULD BE FREE TO DO AS IT SEES FIT; ALL BETS WOULD BE  
OFF. HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN

NOTE BY OC/T: PARAS. 9. AND 10. GARBLED.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

TOMORROW OR A FEW MONTHS FROM NOW, BUT HE WOULD  
CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT WITH A PRE-  
SERVED CAPABILITY IN JORDAN TO REVERSE THE PROCESS.

12. ON THE MILITARY QUESTION, I ASKED RIFAI WHETHER  
THERE HAD BEEN MUCH PRESSURE FOR A JOINT COMMAND IN  
LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT SYRIANS HAD PUSHED HARD FOR  
GREATER INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS. HE SAID NO,  
ON THE CONTRARY, THEY HAD NOT PUSHED HARD ON A MILITARY  
COMMAND, BUT RATHER HAD WISHED ONLY TO CONTINUE THE  
PRESENT COORDINATION. HE SAID PRESENT EFFORTS ARE  
BASED ON COORDINATION AND PLANNING IN THE EVENT OF AN  
ISRAELI ATTACK AND GO NO FURTHER THAN THAT. THEY WILL  
CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE VISITS AND WORK ALONG THESE  
LINES.

13. I THEN ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT THE SYRIANS WOULD

CONTINUE HEAVY PRESSURE ON ISRAELI EXPULSION FROM THE UN AND WHERE THAT WOULD LEAD. HE SAID THAT THIS ALSO HAD COME UP IN THE DAMASCUS TALKS WHICH YOU HAD HELD WITH ASAD. HE NOTED THAT SYRIA WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE THE PRESSURE AND DO WHAT IT COULD, BUT HE DOUBTED THAT THIS ACTIVITY WOULD RESULT IN ISRAELI EXPULSION FROM THE UN THIS YEAR.

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14. I THEN ASKED HIM FOR A READOUT ON SYRIAN VIEWS ABOUT IRAQ. HE SAID ASAD IS STILL LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO TAKE ON THE IRAQIS MILITARILY. IT COULD BE ANYTHING IN THE AREA, OR SOME EPISODE OR EVENT ALONG THE BORDER. THE SYRIANS SEEM TO BE SPOINLING FOR A FIGHT AND THE IRAQIS ARE LAYING LOW FOR THE PRESENT.

15. HE THEN REPORTED THAT WHEN PRINCE FAHD WAS HERE, HE INDICATED SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE EGYPTIANS HAVING TO GIVE TOO MUCH IN THIS AGREEMENT IN RETURN FOR SO LITTLE. (COMMENT: FAHD HAD JUST OF COURSE COME FROM DAMASCUS BEFORE HIS VISIT HERE AND COULD WELL BE REFLECTING, AS JORDANIANS OBVIOUSLY ARE, A VERY HEAVY DOSE OF THE SYRIAN OUTLOOK ON WHAT THE NEXT INTERIM STEP MEANS FOR EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD. END COMMENT).

16. WE THEN DISCUSSED BRIEFLY SYRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PLO AND THE PALESTINAINS. RIFAI SAYS THE SYRIANS ARE INCREASINGLY FED UP WITH THE PRESENT PLO LEADERSHIP AND SEEM TO WANT TO EFFECT SOME SORT OF GRADUAL CHANGEM THEY HOPE TO BEGIN BY SHIFTING SOME OF THE LEADERS IN THE PLO NATIONAL COUNCIL WHICH IS TO MEET SOON. RIFAI'S VIEW WAS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY MORE REALISTIC ABOUT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION AND THAT WHILE HE DID NOT SAY SO, HE IMPLIED THAT JORDAN HAD HAD SOME MODERATING INFLUENCE ON SYRIA IN THIS RESPECT.

17. FINALLY, I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE NORTH YEMEN LEADER LT. COL. HAMDI. HE REPLIED WITH HIS CHARACTERISTICALLY UPWARD SURGE OF THE EYEBROWS INDICATING THAT NOTHING HAD REALLY TRANSPIRED. HE SAID THAT HAMDI WAS HOPEFUL THAT HE COULD GET SAUDI HELP AND THAT JORDAN WOULD BE PROVIDING MORE MILITARY ADVISORS WHICH HAMDI APPEARED TO WANT.

18. RIFAI ENDED BY INDICATING THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN WHAT YOU CAN TELL THEM NOT



ONLY ABOUT THE PRESENT INTERIM STEP, BUT ALSO WHERE YOU  
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THINK THINGS ARE GOING FROM HERE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE  
YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT IS TO HAPPEN NEXT ON THE GOLAN,  
AND HE HOPES ON THE WEST BANK, HOW AND WHEN YOU SEE  
GENEVA TAKING PLACE AND WHAT IT MIGHT POSSIBLY  
ACCOMPLISH, AND LAST BUT CERTAINLY NOT LEAST WHERE  
YOU SEE US GOING ON THE HAWK DEAL.

19. COMMENT: THE ABOVE PRETTY MUCH SPEAKS FOR  
ITSELF. JORDAN IS DEVELOPING A MASSIVE CASE OF  
DISENCHANTMENT ON THE PRESENT STEP, QUITE POSSIBLY THROUGH SYRIAN  
INITIATIVE. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT  
FOR US TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT IN ANY WAY WE CAN  
ON WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN WORKED OUT FOR  
EACH SIDE AND HOW WE SEE THE EFFECT ON EGYPT AND ITS  
FURTHER RELATIONSHIP TO THE ARAB WORLD OF THE INTERIM  
AGREEMENT. FINALLY, AS WILL BE SEEN FROM THE IMMEDIATELY  
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM REPORTING MY CONVERSATION WITH THE  
KING THE JORDANIANS FEEL SOMETHING OF A SEA-CHANGE  
DEVELOPING IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND IT WILL  
BE MOST IMPORTANT TO DEAL ALSO WITH THIS PROBLEM WHICH  
EXTENDS WELL BEYOND THE QUESTION OF THE HAWK DEAL,  
KING MENTIONED SUCH IMPORTANT ISSUES AS CAN THEY CONTINUE TO HAVE  
CONFIDENCE IN OUR COMMITMENTS WITH CONGRESS TRYING  
TO CONTROL FOREIGN POLICY AND WHAT IS THE LONG-TERM  
CONSTANCY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION TO THE  
PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHEN CONTRASTED WITH  
(A) COMING ELECTIONS IN THE US, AND (B)  
ISRAELI CAPACITY TO RESIST PRESSURE, INDUCE  
COUNTERPRESSURE THROUGH THE LOBBY, AND EXACT A  
HEAVY COMMITMENT IN FUNDS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE US  
FOR ANY FUTURE STEP THAT MIGHT COME ALONG. END COMMENT.  
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## Message Attributes

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